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1. The Hypothesis 
 
There  is  abundant  evidence  that  many  central  banks  tend  to  pursue  significantly  more 
expansionary monetary policies before elections than in normal times.
1 This is true even for 
independent central banks
2 – especially if most members of the central bank council have 
been appointed by the incumbent government or the ruling parties.
3 However, there are also 
cases in which we would not expect a monetary political business cycle – for example, if the 
election is not democratic, if there is no doubt about the reelection of the government, if the 
election  has  to  be  called  at  short  notice  or  if  the  central  bank  is  independent  and  the 
government lacks a partisan majority in the central bank council. Thus, the evidence is likely 
to vary across countries and over time. 
What has not been analyzed so far is the way in which monetary acceleration before 
elections is brought about. This is surprising because the economic and electoral effects of an 
accelerating monetary base growth may crucially depend on whether and to what extent the 
central bank expands the domestic or the foreign component of the monetary base. The main 
difference of effect relates to the exchange rate. If the exchange rate is fixed, the central bank 
is likely to prefer a monetary expansion without devaluation. However, even under a flexible 
exchange rate regime, the authorities will probably wish to minimize the exchange rate effects 
of the monetary acceleration because a depreciation of the currency would be a very visible 
sign of pre-electoral pump-priming and because it would instantaneously raise import prices 
and feed into the general price level. Foreign exchange intervention can be used to reduce the 
unwelcome exchange rate effect of an expansionary pre-electoral monetary policy (Vaubel 
1991, 2005).  
____________________________ 
1 For international panel data analyses see notably Alesina, Cohen, Roubini (1992, Table 7) and Dreher, Vaubel 
(2004, Table 2). Time series analyses for the industrial countries have been presented by Soh (1986, Table 5). 
2  See  Soh’s  results  for  Germany,  Switzerland  and  the  United  States.  For  the  U.S.  see  also  Grier  (1987), 
Havrilesky (1995, Ch. 4) and Carlsen (1997) and for Germany Berger, Woitek (1997) and Lohmann (1998). 
3 See Vaubel (1993, 1997a, b) for Germany and McGregor (1996) for the U.S.   3
Ideally, the central bank might also wish to increase the monetary base of the foreign 
reserve currency to which its own currency is pegged. This would create room for raising 
domestic monetary base growth while maintaining the exchange rate parity. The domestic 
central bank can achieve this objective by first selling foreign exchange reserves in exchange 
for its own central bank money, then sterilizing the reduction of its central bank money supply 
through open-market operations and finally raising its own rate of monetary expansion in line 
with the foreign monetary acceleration which its foreign exchange interventions have brought 
about.  In  the  monetary  approach  to  exchange  rate  determination  and  with  equal  money 
multipliers at home and abroad, the initial decrease of the domestic monetary base due to the 
intervention is overcompensated by an increase that is twice as large.
4 
Of course, the sequence of events may be the reverse. The central bank may start by 
increasing its monetary base through open market operations, then prevent depreciation by 
selling foreign currency and finally sterilize the foreign exchange intervention at home. The 
central bank is likely to prefer this sequence because the incipient depreciation can serve as a 
justification for the foreign exchange intervention. 
If  the  exchange  rate  is  rigidly  fixed,  all  three  operations  have  to  be  executed 
simultaneously.  
In any case, we should expect that some part of the foreign component of the monetary 
base is substituted by the domestic component prior to elections and that this phenomenon is 
not confined to fixed exchange rate regimes.  
So far the analysis has assumed that the foreign central bank does not sterilize the 
increase of its monetary base due to the intervention. Since the foreign central bank issues a 
reserve currency and represents a large country, this assumption is not likely to be warranted. 
In fact, the International Monetary Fund obliges the central banks of its member states to 
inform each other about their foreign exchange interventions, and the U.S. Federal Reserve 
____________________________ 
4 See appendix A for a brief demonstration of this elementary result.    4
System is known to sterilize foreign dollar interventions as a rule. Thus, the more relevant 
case is a foreign exchange intervention that is sterilized in both countries. 
In this case, the ultimate change in the reserve currency country is not an increase in 
the monetary base but an increase in the supply of bonds. Its exchange rate effect cannot be 
analyzed  in  the  framework  of  the  monetary  approach  because  the  latter  views  bonds 
denominated in different currencies as perfect substitutes. The portfolio balance approach has 
to be used. 
If the sale of reserve currency is sterilized by both central banks, the net effect is an 
increase in reserve currency bonds and a decrease in domestic currency bonds. In the portfolio 
balance approach, this asset substitution in supply causes an appreciation of the domestic 
currency, thus raising the domestic rate of monetary expansion consistent with exchange rate 
stability. Once more, the intervention enables the domestic central bank to step up monetary 
expansion before the election without risking a depreciation of the currency. 
Figure 1 contains the standard graphical exposition of the short run effects which are 
relevant for the electoral cycle.
5 It shows all combinations of the nominal exchange rate (E) 
and the domestic interest rate (i) consistent with equilibrium in the domestic money market 
(MM), the market for domestic currency bonds (BB) and the market for foreign currency 
bonds (FF).
6 In Figure 1, a sale of reserves that is sterilized in both countries shifts the BB 
curve to the left from BBo to BB1 (the purchase of domestic currency bonds lowers their rate 
____________________________ 
5 For a textbook exposition see, e.g., Claassen (1996: 76ff.). The graph is related to Branson (1977) but Branson 
does not cover the case of foreign exchange interventions. 
6 The equilibrium condition for the money market (MM) slopes upwards because an increase in the interest rate 
reduces the demand for money whereas an increase in E (a depreciation of the domestic currency) raises the 
value of foreign-currency bonds and total portfolio size in terms of the domestic currency and thereby increases 
the  demand  for  domestic  money.  The  equilibrium  condition  for  domestic  currency  bonds  (BB)  slopes 
downwards because the demand for these bonds depends positively on both i and E, i.e., portfolio size. The 
equilibrium condition for foreign currency bonds (FF) is also downward sloping because an increase in the 
domestic interest rate reduces the demand for foreign currency bonds while the depreciation of the domestic 
currency increases the supply of foreign currency bonds in terms of the domestic currency. However, FF is 
flatter than BB because changes in i have a stronger effect on the demand for domestic currency bonds (i is their 
own rate of return) than on the demand for foreign currency bonds.   5
of return i) and the FF curve down from FFo to FF1 (the sale of foreign currency bonds 
lowers E). The net effect is an appreciation of the domestic currency (from E* to EFEI) and a 
drop in the domestic interest rate from iA to iFEI. The equilibrium moves from point A to point 
FEI. The domestic central bank may now return to E* by implementing an expansionary open 
market operation shifting MM to MM2 and BB further to BB2 so that equilibrium point B is 
reached.  Thus,  it  may  increase  monetary  expansion  and  lower  the  interest  rate  without 
depreciating the exchange rate.  
If  the  central  bank  raised  the  domestic  component  of  the  monetary  base  without 
reducing the foreign component at the same time, both the BB and the MM curves would shift 
to the left, intersecting at OMO, and the lower domestic interest rate iB could only be attained 
at the (electoral) cost of depreciating the currency to EOMO.  
The combination of a fully sterilized sale of foreign exchange and an expansionary 
domestic open market operation does not stimulate the economy unless it is unexpected – at 
least in part. Thus, it is a Keynesian strategy. Indeed, in the negotiations at Bretton Woods in 
1944, it was Lord Keynes who insisted that the newly founded fixed exchange rate system 
should be bolstered up by a generous supply of subsidized foreign exchange credits to be 
provided by the newly founded International Monetary Fund. The foreign exchange credits 
would give the member countries some leeway to pursue their own macroeconomic policies 
irrespective of their international exchange rate commitments. It was also clear that the credits 
would enable the governments to generate monetary political business cycles.
7 
 
2. Empirical specification and results 
 
Our  hypothesis  predicts  that  foreign  exchange  reserves  drop  before  elections  and  are 
replenished sometime thereafter. It also predicts that the fall of the foreign component of the 
____________________________ 
7  The  GMM  estimates  of  Dreher,  Vaubel  (2004)  show  that  new  net  non-concessional  credits  from  the 
International Monetary Fund relative to GDP are significantly larger prior to elections.   6
monetary  base  is  overcompensated  by  an  increase  in  the  domestic  component.  In  the 
following, we test only for the first part of the hypothesis because there exists already ample 
evidence that the rate of expansion of the money supply and hence of the monetary base tends 
to rise prior to elections.
8  
Our dependent variable is the log of international reserves to trend GDP. As in other 
studies (e.g., Lane and Burke 2001), GDP is used as a scale variable. We employ trend GDP 
rather than current GDP because the latter may also be affected by the political business 
cycle. However, our results do not depend on this modification. Trend GDP is calculated with 
the Hodrick-Prescott filter. Following the bulk of recent literature, international reserves are 
measured net of gold holdings because central banks do not cyclically vary their holdings of 
gold reserves. But inclusion of gold reserves, valued at SDR 35 per ounce, would not change 
the main results of the paper.  
We measure the pre-election period by the share of the year which is within twelve 
months prior to a national election.
9 Similarly, the post-election period is measured by the 
share of the year which is within twelve months after an election. To test the robustness of our 
results, we alternatively include an election year dummy in the following section. 
As for the other explanatory variables, we follow Lane and Burke (2001) as closely as 
possible.
10 GDP per capita is included to control for development. More developed countries 
may wish to hold smaller amounts of reserves as they are more rarely affected by speculative 
crises. However, since they can afford to hold more reserves, the expected impact of per 
capita GDP is not obvious a priori. The sum of exports and imports (in percent of GDP) 
measures  a  country’s  openness  to  trade.  More  open  countries  are  expected  to  hold  more 
____________________________ 
8 Moreover, a simple regression of M2 (in percent of GDP) on our pre-election index introduced below yields a 
positive and highly significant coefficient. 
9 For example, if the election took place in February, the index would take the value of 2/12 in that year and 
10/12 in the year before. A similar variable is employed in Dreher and Vaubel (2004). 
10 The authors derive them from the model of Frenkel and Jovanovic (1981). Central banks face a trade-off 
between macroeconomic adjustment costs in the absence of international reserves and the opportunity costs of 
holding them.   7
reserves as they are more vulnerable to external shocks. Another explanatory variable is the 
level of external debt (in percent of GDP) because reserves might serve as collateral for debt 
or be used to offset sudden capital outflows. Since empirical studies find external debt to be 
among the most important causes of currency crises (Dreher, Herz and Karb 2004), more 
reserves might be accumulated to account for this risk. 
The  standard  deviation  of  the  growth  rate  of  exports  (over  the  last  five  years)  is 
employed to measure external volatility. If volatility is high, reserve levels are more likely to 
hit their lower bound. Thus, higher volatility should lead countries to hold more reserves.
11 A 
variable  measuring  the  degree  of  exchange  rate  flexibility  is  also  included.  It  is  usually 
assumed that peggers hold more reserves than floaters. However, as we have explained in 
section 1, politicians may have a keen interest in accumulating foreign reserves even under a 
flexible exchange rate regime.
12 
Lane and Burke also include population, M2 relative to GDP and the share of short-
term debt in total external debt as explanatory variables. As we are not convinced by their 
arguments for doing so
13, we omit these variables in our preferred estimates (Tables 1 and 2) 
but our tests for robustness (Tables 3-6) include them. 
Moreover, we do not follow Lane and Burke in estimating a cross-section. They chose 
a cross-section analysis because they wanted to abstract from cyclical fluctuations in reserves. 
____________________________ 
11 This measure for external volatility has also been employed, among others, by Edwards (1985), Flood and 
Marion (2002, 2004) and Choi and Baek (2004). 
12  Williamson  (1976)  suggests  that  more  reserves  might  be  held  under  flexible  regimes  to  compensate  for 
destabilizing capital flows. Grimes (1993) even argues that the level of reserves might not be influenced by the 
exchange rate regime at all when the opportunity costs of holding reserves is sufficiently small or if central 
banks are highly risk averse regarding reserve shortages. 
13 According to Lane and Burke (2001), population is used as a proxy for country size because „if the absolute 
level of international reserves matters in deterring speculators, a larger country may be able to survive with a 
lower reserves/ GDP ratio”. Why should the absolute level of reserves matter, and is population a good proxy for 
the size of the country or economy? Their rationale for including the M2/ GDP ratio is that international reserves 
are higher “to the extent that the liabilities of the domestic financial sector are partly denominated in foreign 
currency.” Is the M2/ GDP ratio in any way related to the share of foreign currency liabilities? The share of short 
term debt in total external debt is hardly exogenous. The level of reserves may affect the maturity of foreign debt 
and both are likely to be affected by international debt and currency crises.   8
However, cyclical fluctuations induced by elections are precisely what we are interested in. 
Thus, we need pooled time-series cross-section analyses (panel data). 
The  annual  data  cover  the  years  1975-2001  and  extend  to  a  maximum  of  158 
countries.
14 Since some of the data are not available for all countries or years, the panel data 
are  unbalanced  and  our  number  of  observations  depends  on  the  choice  of  explanatory 
variables. Since there was significant first-order autocorrelation in all models, the disturbance 
term is modeled as an AR(1) process. We found significant fixed country and period effects in 
all specifications. However, the coefficients of the country and time effects are not reported in 
the tables. All variables, their precise definitions and data sources are listed in the appendix.
15 
Table  1  ignores  interactions.  As  can  be  seen  in  column  1,  reserve  holdings  are 
significantly lower when the standard deviation of export growth rises, with a coefficient 
significant at the one percent level. This result is not in line with the hypothesis. As will be 
seen, however, it is not robust with respect to outliers and the inclusion or omission of control 
variables. Moreover, throughout the analysis, omission of this variable would not qualitatively 
affect  our  results.  At  the  one  percent  level  of  significance,  and  in  line  with  our  a  priori 
hypothesis, openness to trade leads to higher reserve holdings. Reserves rise with per capita 
GDP at the ten percent level of significance. The fixed exchange rate dummy, based on the 
(de facto) classification of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) has no significant impact on reserves. 
This is in line with previous research (e.g., Lane and Burke 2001). The results also show that 
external debt does not significantly influence reserve holdings. As for the electoral cycle, the 
pre-election index takes a negative coefficient which is significant at the five percent level. 
The post-election index, however, is completely insignificant.  
____________________________ 
14 Our selection of countries is determined by data availability. The countries included in our sample are listed in 
Appendix D. 
15 Due to the difference in estimation procedure, we have to deviate slightly from column 8 of Lane and Burke’s 
Table 7. Lane and Burke include the fraction of years a country had restrictions on the capital account over the 
sample period and a dummy for countries heavily dependent on oil revenues. Since these variables do not vary 
over time, we cannot use them in our fixed effects specifications.   9
Regarding  the  quantitative  impact  of  the  explanatory  variables,  a  ten  percentage 
points increase in trade openness increases the level of international reserves (relative to trend 
GDP) by six percent. An 0.1 percentage point increase in the standard deviation of export 
growth reduces them by 6.7 percent. Twelve months prior to an election, reserve holdings are 
almost 9 percent lower than otherwise. 
Column  2  includes  the  lagged  dependent  variable.  As  can  be  seen,  most  previous 
results  remain.  The  only  exception  is  the  coefficient  of  per  capita  GDP  which  is  now 
insignificant. The pre-election index is still significant at the five percent level – the post 
election index remains insignificant. The lagged dependent variable is highly significant: 42 
percent of the desired adjustment takes place contemporaneously. The regression explains 52 
percent of the variation of the dependent variable. 
However,  there  is  a  problem  with  panel  data  regressions  including  the  lagged 
dependent variable. Since the lagged endogenous variable is correlated with the error term in 
the presence of fixed country effects, the OLS estimator is biased and inconsistent in a short 
panel (Nickel 1981). For this reason, we proceed to the Generalized Methods of Moments 
(GMM) estimator suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991). This estimator removes the fixed 
country effects by first-differencing the equation. Lagged levels of the dependent variable and 
differences  of  the  exogenous  right  hand  side  variables  are  then  used  as  instruments.  The 
period effects and the other indices/dummies are strictly exogenous variables and are simply 
instrumented by themselves. 
Since  there  are  more  instruments  than  right-hand  side  variables,  the  equations  are 
over-identified and the instruments must be weighted. The Arellano-Bond one-step estimator 
uses the identity matrix as a weighting matrix. The two-step estimator weighs the instruments 
asymptotically efficiently using the covariance of the one-step estimates. However, standard 
errors tend to be under-estimated by the two-step estimator (Arellano and Bond 1991: 291). 
For this reason, we report the one-step estimates only.   10
We employ a Sargan test to ensure that the instruments are not correlated with the 
error term, and we use the Arellano-Bond test for second-order autocorrelation in the first 
difference residuals because the estimator would not be consistent in the presence of second-
order correlation. In line with the bulk of literature, these tests are based on the two-step 
estimator. 
Column 3 of Table 1 reports the results. While trade openness remains significant at 
the five percent level, the negative coefficient of the standard deviation of export growth 
which ran counter to the hypothesis is no longer significant. Again, the coefficient of the pre-
election index is negative and significant at the five percent level. Both the Sargan test and the 
Arellano-Bond test clearly accept the specification, indicating that the estimator is consistent. 
In  Table  2  we  further  test  for  the  impact  of  fixed  exchange  rate  regimes  on 
international  reserve holdings. We interact all independent variables with this dummy. In 
doing so, we test for the hypothesis that the exchange rate regime affects the way in which the 
other  explanatory  variables  determine  reserve  holdings.  Column  1  omits  the  lagged 
endogenous  variable,  column  3  reports  results  estimated  with  the  Arellano-Bond  GMM 
estimator. 
As  can  be  seen,  the  coefficients  of  the  election  variables  are  insignificant  when 
estimated with OLS. Only in the consistent GMM estimate of column 3 would the negative 
coefficient of the pre-election index be significant at the ten percent level. Also in column 3, 
the post-election index has a positive impact on reserve holdings. The impact remains positive 
under fixed exchange rates but declines. The election indices and their interaction terms are 
jointly significant at the five percent level at least. Overall, however, the interaction terms are 
jointly  insignificant  in  all  regressions.  As  can  be  seen  in  the  Table,  most  of  them  are 
individually  insignificant  as  well.  To  summarize  Table  2,  international  reserves  do  not 
significantly depend on the exchange rate regime – neither directly nor through interactions. 
However, the collinearity introduced by the interactions undermines the significance of most 
direct effects.    11
 
3. Testing for Robustness 
 
How  robust  are  these  results  to  changes  in  the  selection  of  explanatory  variables,  the 
measurement  of  the  electoral  effect  and  the observations  included  in  the  regressions?  To 
increase the number of observations, we omit the variables GDP per capita and government 
debt which have been insignificant in most previous regressions. 
First,  regarding  additional  variables,  we  follow  the  previous  literature  to  identify 
candidate  variables.  Choi  and  Baek  (2004)  suggest  including  GDP  as  a  measure  of  size, 
squared per capita GDP in addition to GDP per capita, financial openness (measured as gross 
private capital flows as a share of GDP) and lending interest rates (as a proxy for opportunity 
costs of holding reserves). Lane and Burke (2001) propose the M2/GDP ratio as a measure of 
financial depth and population as a proxy for country size. They also use short term debt as a 
share of total debt. As an additional test, we employ the IMF’s de jure exchange regime 
classification instead of the de facto classification by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) included 
above. 
Second, and equally important, we focus on the role of outliers. Some authors suggest 
using so-called robust estimation techniques to deal with them. Robust estimators can be 
thought of as trying to identify that part of the data best approximated by the model being 
estimated (see de Haan and Sturm 2003 for an illustrative discussion). We therefore employ 
the  Least  Median  Squares  (LMS)  estimator  introduced  by  Rousseeuw  (1984)  to  test  the 
robustness of our results, minimizing the median of the squared residuals. This estimator will 
not be influenced by observations lying outside the typical relationship between the dependent 
and explanatory variables revealed by the remaining data. In using this estimator, we have to 
omit the fixed country and period effects.   12
Finally, we try a simple election year dummy in place of our pre- and post-election 
indices because the rundown of reserves before the election may trigger a speculative crisis 
which continues beyond the election day. 
Table 3 contains the results of the OLS/LMS regressions, Table 4 the consistent GMM 
regressions.
16 In column 1 of both Tables, the IMF’s de jure classification of the exchange 
rate regime replaces the de facto regime. The coefficient remains insignificant. Among the 
additional  variables  (columns  2-9),  only  money/GDP,  short-term  debt  and,  in  the  OLS 
regressions, financial openness pass the 10 per cent significance test. In all regressions which 
are consistently estimated by GMM, the coefficient of the pre-election index is negative and 
significant at least at the 10 per cent level. The same holds for most OLS regressions. There 
are two exceptions. When money relative to GDP or the lending interest rate is included, the 
coefficient loses its significance. Since both variables are also influenced by the political 
business cycle, this is not surprising. The results also confirm that the significance of the post-
election index depends on whether the regression is estimated by OLS or consistently by 
GMM. 
Column 9 of Table 3 reports the regression estimated with Least Median Squares. 
Again, the pre-election index is significant at the ten percent level, indicating that the previous 
results are not driven by outliers. The post-election index has no significant impact on reserve 
holdings. 
In Tables 5 and 6, we use an election year dummy instead of the pre- and post-election 
indices. The results are very similar to the previous ones. In Table 5, the election dummy is 
significant  at  the  one  percent  level  in  the  three  regressions  without  interactions,  with  a 
negative coefficient. When interactions are included (Table 6), the dummy is individually 
significant  at  the  five  percent  level  in  the OLS  regressions.  The  election  dummy  and  its 
____________________________ 
16 Again, all variables have also been interacted with the regime dummy. As the results are qualitatively identical 
to  those  reported  previously,  we  do  not  reproduce  these  regressions  here.  We  also  replicated  all  (OLS-) 
regressions with GMM, obtaining qualitatively similar results. These results are available upon request. 
   13
interaction with the exchange rate dummy are jointly significant in all regressions. We also 
replicated the regressions of Tables 3 and 4 with the election year dummy. Its coefficient is 
negative and significant in all regressions estimated with OLS/LMS and GMM . 
In summary, our result is robust regarding outliers and the inclusion of other control 
variables suggested in the literature. As for the quantitative impact of elections, the smallest 
significant coefficient (Table 3, column 2, among others) implies that reserve holdings are 4.8 
percent lower in pre-election years; the highest coefficients (Table 2, column 3) indicate a 
reduction of 20 percent in pre-election years when the exchange rate is freely floating and a 




Democratic  elections  tend  to  have  a  significantly  negative  effect  on  the  level  of  foreign 
exchange reserves relative to trend GDP. This result is robust to the measurement of the 
election  effect,  the  choice  of  control  variables  and  the  influence  of  outliers.  It  is  fully 
consistent with the hypothesis that central banks use foreign exchange interventions to gain 
leeway for expansionary open market operations without depreciating the currency at election 
time.  
The evidence is compatible with the alternative hypothesis that elections raise political 
risk and induce capital flight. Even though the expected change of government may just as 
well cause a net inflow of capital, there may be a pre-electoral risk premium which reduces 
net  capital  flows.  We  have  tested  for  this  possibility  but  we  do  not  find  a  significant 
correlation between our pre-election index and net private capital flows.   
Our results are also in line with the hypothesis suggested by Aizenman and Marion 
(2004) that a ’tough’ administration has little incentive to accumulate reserves if there is some 
probability that a future administration will be ‘soft’ (and will thus allocate the reserves to   14
favoured groups).
17 As elections might lead to a change in regime, ‘tough’ governments 
might reduce their holdings of reserves. However, including the interaction of the pre-election 
index with a dummy for right-wing governments as classified by Beck et al. (2001) does not 
yield a significant coefficient in any specification, while the significance of the pre-election 
index is not affected. 
As there is ample evidence of monetary political business cycles, we conclude that 
central banks tend to run down their foreign exchange reserves at election time in order to 
mitigate the exchange rate effect of their expansionary monetary policies and replenish them 
thereafter.  
____________________________ 
17 See also Aizenman and Marion (2002).   15
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Table 1: International Reserves relative to trend GDP (logarithm, 1975-2001) 
Explanatory Variables  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Part of the year which is within  -0.088  -0.090  -0.160 
    12 months prior to an election  (2.22**)  (1.99**)  (2.53**) 
Part of the year which is within  -0.006  0.034  0.095 
    12 months after an election  (0.15)  (0.75)  (1.58) 
Fixed Exchange Rates,   0.095  0.055  0.006 
    Dummy  (1.48)  (0.92)  (0.31) 
GDP per capita  0.449  0.014  -0.439 
  (1.65
o)  (0.11)  (1.35) 
Openness  0.006  0.005  0.006 
  (3.19*)  (3.30*)  (2.34**) 
Debt (percent of GDP)  -0.001  -0.001  -0.0001 
  (1.40)  (1.57)  (0.22) 
Export Growth,  -0.665  -0.421  -0.190 
    Standard Deviation  (2.76*)  (2.23**)  (0.63) 
Lagged Endogenous     0.581  0.614 
    Variable    (25.46*)  (9.34*) 
Number of countries  76  76  76 
Number of observations  1368  1359  1356 





R² (overall)  0.14  0.52   
Sargan Test (p-level)      1.00 
Arellano-Bond-Test (p-level)      0.89 
 
Notes: 
Fixed country and period effects included in OLS regressions; fixed period effects included in 
GMM regression. 
(robust) t-statistics in parentheses: 
*, **, 
o significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively 
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Table 2:   International Reserves relative to  trend  GDP  with  interactions  (logarithm, 
1975-2001) 
Explanatory Variables  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Part of the year which is within  -0.100  -0.077  -0.200 
    12 months prior to an election  (1.15)  (0.75)  (1.66
o) 
Pre-election index*fixed rate
#  0.016  0.016  0.050 
  (0.16)  (0.13)  (0.31) 
Part of the year which is within  0.014  0.061  0.326 
    12 months after an election  (0.15)  (0.56)  (2.50**) 
Post-election index*fixed rate
#  -0.029  -0.034  -0.287 
  (0.29)  (0.29)  (1.89
o) 
Fixed Exchange Rates,  0.045  -0.267  0.059 
    Dummy  (0.09)  (0.61)  (1.55) 
GDP per capita  0.386  0.013  -0.584 
  (1.39)  (0.09)  (1.86
o) 
GDP p.c.*fixed rate
#  -0.013  0.019  -0.022 
  (0.22)  (0.35)  (0.80) 
Openness  0.004  0.002  0.005 
  (1.76
o)  (0.87)  (1.58) 
Openness*fixed rate
#  0.003  0.003  0.002 
  (1.65
o)  (1.67
o)  (0.59) 
Debt (percent of GDP)  -0.001  -0.0004  0.0001 
  (1.03)  (0.78)  (0.23) 
Debt*fixed rate
#  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  (1.61)  (1.13)  (2.02**) 
Export Growth,  -1.070  -0.915  -1.338 
    Standard Deviation  (2.00**)  (1.85
o)  (2.55*) 
Export Growth*fixed rate
#  0.456  0.540  1.361 
  (0.83)  (1.06)  (3.07*) 
Lagged Endogenous     0.574  0.595 
    Variable    (24.95*)  (8.50*) 
Number of countries  76  76  76 
Number of observations  1368  1359  1355 
Method of Estimation  OLS AR(1) OLS AR(1) GMM 
R² (overall)  0.14  0.52   
Sargan Test (p-level)      1.00 
Arellano-Bond-Test (p-level)      0.96 
Notes: 
# Coefficient and t-statistic of interaction of the dummy for fixed exchange regimes with corresponding variable. 
Fixed country and period effects included in OLS regressions; fixed period effects included in GMM regression. 
(robust) t-statistics in parentheses: *, **, 
o significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.   21
Table 3: International Reserves relative to trend GDP (logarithm, 1975-2001): tests for 
robustness 
Explanatory Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Part of the year which is within  -0.055  -0.048  -0.048  -0.034 
    12 months prior to an election  (1.82
o)  (1.71
o)  (1.70
o)  (1.11) 
Part of the year which is within  0.012  0.007  0.006  0.020 
    12 months after an election  (0.39)  (0.24)  (0.19)  (0.66) 
Fixed Exchange Rates,  -0.040       
    de jure, Dummy  (1.20)       
Openness  0.004  0.003  0.004  0.004 
  (4.15*)  (4.59*)  (4.78*)  (4.24*) 
Export Growth,  -0.249  -0.133  -0.085  -0.236 
    Standard Deviation  (2.21**)  (1.33)  (0.84)  (1.59) 
GDP     0.032     
    (0.77)     
GDP per capita      -0.00002  
      (1.19)   
GDP per capita squared      9.23e-11   
      (0.26)   
Lending interest rate        -0.0001 
        (0.81) 
Lagged Endogenous   0.647  0.644  0.661  0.532 
    Variable  (39.48*)  (42.37*)  (45.34*)  (28.66*) 
Number of countries  118  158  157  149 
Number of observations  2240  2723  2699  2136 








R² (overall)  0.53  0.54  0.56  0.42 
 
Notes: 
Fixed country and period effects included in OLS regressions. 
(robust) t-statistics in parentheses: 
*, **, 
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Table  3  (continued):  International  Reserves  relative  to  trend  GDP  (logarithm,  1975-
2001): tests for robustness 
Explanatory Variables  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Part of the year which is within  -0.048  -0.046  -0.048  -0.062  -0.046 
    12 months prior to an election  (1.68




Part of the year which is within  0.009  0.010  0.006  0.027  -0.001 
    12 months after an election  (0.30)  (0.32)  (0.20)  (0.75)  (0.04) 
Openness  0.003  0.004  0.003  0.004  0.001 
  (4.48*)  (5.07*)  (4.63*)  (3.91*)  (3.30*) 
Export Growth,  -0.119  -0.128  -0.104  -0.147  0.050 
    Standard Deviation  (1.23)  (1.23)  (1.03)  (1.03)  (0.72) 
Fixed Exchange Rates,           -0.003 
    Dummy          (0.13) 
GDP per capita          0.002 
          (0.20) 
Debt (percent of GDP)          -0.0002 
          (1.78
o) 
Financial Openness  -0.001         
  (1.90
o)         
Money (percent of GDP)    -0.004       
    (3.29*)       
Population      0.228     
      (1.59)     
Short-term debt (percent        -0.004   
    of total external debt)        (2.39**)   
Lagged Endogenous   0.670  0.639  0.651  0.619  0.926 
    Variable  (44.86*)  (40.61*)  (44.26*)  (34.87*)  (123.90*) 
Number of countries  154  144  158  124  76 
Number of observations  2560  2404  2723  1998  1435 









R² (overall)  0.57  0.55  0.55  0.54  0.63 
 
Notes: 
Fixed country and period effects included in OLS regressions. 
(robust) t-statistics in parentheses: 
*, **, 
o significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively 
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Table 4: International Reserves relative to trend GDP (logarithm, 1975-2001): tests for 
robustness 
Explanatory Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Part of the year which is within  -0.090  -0.082  -0.068  -0.068 
    12 months prior to an election  (2.27**)  (2.25**)  (1.92
o)  (1.63
o) 
Part of the year which is within  0.082  0.086  0.092  0.071 
    12 months after an election  (1.79
o)  (2.25**)  (2.26**)  (1.67
o) 
Fixed Exchange Rates,  -0.020       
    de jure, Dummy  (1.47)       
Openness  0.005  0.004  0.005  0.005 
  (2.75*)  (2.52**)  (3.14*)  (3.43*) 
Export Growth,  -0.333  -0.156  -0.195  -0.302 
    Standard Deviation  (1.66
o)  (0.97)  (1.15)  (1.33) 
GDP     0.018     
    (0.15)     
GDP per capita      0.00003   
      (0.51)   
GDP per capita squared      1.60e-09   
      (1.17)   
Lending interest rate        -0.00004 
        (0.70) 
Lagged Endogenous   0.682  0.691  0.696  0.548 
    Variable  (11.19*)  (12.08*)  (12.33*)  (7.35*) 
Number of countries  118  158  157  149 
Number of observations  2236  2716  2692  2120 
Method of Estimation  GMM  GMM  GMM  GMM 
Sargan Test (p-level)  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Arellano-Bond-Test (p-level)  0.99  0.30  0.44  0.53 
 
Notes: 
Fixed period effects included. 
(robust) t-statistics in parentheses: 
*, **, 
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Table  4  (continued):  International  Reserves  relative  to  trend  GDP  (logarithm,  1975-
2001): tests for robustness 
Explanatory Variables  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Part of the year which is within  -0.071  -0.069  -0.081  -0.107 
    12 months prior to an election  (1.96**)  (1.81
o)  (2.24**)  (2.33**) 
Part of the year which is within  0.088  0.085  0.085  0.117 
    12 months after an election  (2.25**)  (2.05**)  (2.23**)  (2.52**) 
Openness  0.005  0.005  0.004  0.005 
  (2.73*)  (2.76*)  (2.72*)  (2.81*) 
Export Growth,  -0.209  -0.212  -0.155  -0.118 
    Standard Deviation  (1.26)  (1.31)  (0.99)  (0.57) 
Fixed Exchange Rates,          
    Dummy         
GDP per capita         
         
Debt (percent of GDP)         
         
Financial Openness  0.0001       
  (0.39)       
Money (percent of GDP)    -0.006     
    (2.67*)     
Population      0.156   
      (0.33)   
Short-term debt (percent        -0.004 
    of total external debt)        (1.78
o) 
Lagged Endogenous   0.704  0.681  0.698  0.655 
    Variable  (14.56*)  (13.15*)  (14.42*)  (11.69*) 
Number of countries  154  144  158  124 
Number of observations  2552  2396  2716  1991 
Method of Estimation  GMM  GMM  GMM  GMM 
Sargan Test (p-level)  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Arellano-Bond-Test (p-level)  0.21  0.34  0.30  0.55 
 
Notes: 
Fixed period effects included. 
(robust) t-statistics in parentheses: 
*, **, 
o significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively 
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Table 5: International Reserves relative to trend GDP (logarithm, 1975-2001) : tests for 
robustness 
 
Explanatory Variables  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Election, Dummy  -0.098  -0.117  -0.121 
  (3.77*)  (3.47*)  (2.78*) 
Fixed Exchange Rates,   0.098  0.044  0.0004 
    Dummy  (1.55)  (0.78)  (0.02) 
GDP per capita  -0.039  0.053  -0.368 
  (0.25)  (0.46)  (1.14) 
Openness  0.005  0.004  0.005 
  (2.61*)  (3.19*)  (2.09**) 
Debt (percent of GDP)  -0.001  -0.001  -0.00003 
  (1.78
o)  (1.45)  (0.06) 
Export Growth,  -0.610  -0.423  -0.193 
    Standard Deviation  (2.61*)  (2.38**)  (0.69) 
Lagged Endogenous     0.625  0.630 
    Variable    (29.09*)  (8.88*) 
Number of countries  76  76  76 
Number of observations  1441  1432  1429 





R² (overall)  0.21  0.79   
Sargan Test (p-level)      1.00 
Arellano-Bond-Test (p-
level) 
    0.17 
 
Notes: 
Fixed country and period effects included in OLS regressions; fixed period effects included in 
GMM regression. 
(robust) t-statistics in parentheses: 
*, **, 
o significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively   26
Table 6:   International Reserves relative to  trend  GDP  with  interactions  (logarithm, 
1975-2001): tests for robustness 
Explanatory Variables  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Election, Dummy  -0.141  -0.169  -0.145 
  (2.35**)  (2.15**)  (1.39) 
Election*fixed rate
#  0.051  0.063  0.035 
  (0.77)  (0.72)  (0.29) 
Fixed Exchange Rates,   -0.158  -0.231  -0.006 
    Dummy  (0.33)  (0.55)  (0.18) 
GDP per capita  -0.066  0.035  -0.416 
  (0.42)  (0.29)  (1.34) 
GDP p.c.*fixed rate
#  0.014  0.014  -0.021 
  (0.23)  (0.26)  (0.76) 
Openness  0.003  0.001  0.004 
  (1.33)  (0.69)  (1.45) 
Openness*fixed rate
#  0.003  0.003  0.001 
  (1.57)  (1.67
o)  (0.39) 
Debt (percent of GDP)  -0.001  -0.0003  0.0001 
  (1.34)  (0.52)  (0.24) 
Debt*fixed rate
#  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  (1.75
o)  (1.21)  (1.43) 
Export Growth,  -1.098  -0.767  -1.130 
    Standard Deviation  (2.09**)  (1.66
o)  (2.50**) 
Export Growth*fixed rate
#  0.538  0.375  1.113 
  (1.00)  (0.78)  (2.50**) 
Lagged Endogenous     0.619  0.623 
    Variable    (28.58*)  (8.42*) 
Number of countries  76  76  76 
Number of observations  1441  1432  1428 
Method of Estimation  OLS AR(1) OLS AR(1) GMM 
R² (overall)  0.14  0.79   
Sargan Test (p-level)      1.00 
Arellano-Bond-Test (p-
level) 
    0.20 
Notes: 
# Coefficient and t-statistic of interaction of the dummy for fixed exchange regimes with 
corresponding variable. 
Fixed country and period effects included in OLS regressions; fixed period effects included in 
GMM regression. 
(robust) t-statistics in parentheses: 
*, **, 
o significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. 
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Appendix A: Monetary Approach 
 
The money supply at home (Md) and abroad (Mf) is the product of the monetary base (B) and 
the money multiplier (m): 
(1) Md     md  · Bd 
(2) Mf     mf · Bf 
The sale of foreign exchange raises the foreign monetary base by the same amount by which 
it reduces the domestic monetary base: 
(3)  Bf · E* = - Bd 
where E* is the fixed exchange rate (units of domestic currency per one unit of the foreign 
currency).  





















       
where Pd and Pf are the domestic and foreign price levels and yd and yf are the exogenous 
domestic and foreign permanent income levels, respectively.  
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 Thus, the decrease of – Bd in equation (3) has to be overcompensated by an 
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Appendix B: Variable Definitions and Sources 
Variable  Source  Definition 




Net international reserves comprise 
special drawing rights, reserves of IMF 
members held by the IMF, and 
holdings of foreign exchange under the 
control of monetary authorities. Gold 
holdings are excluded. Data used are 
the log (reserves divided by trend 
GDP). The trend GDP series has been 
calculated employing the Hodrick-
Prescott filter. 
Election, Dummy  Beck et al. 
(2001) 
Equals one in years of national 
elections and zero otherwise. 
Part of the year which is 




based on Beck 
et al. (2001) 
Includes the election month as being 
part of the pre-election period. For 
example, if an election would be in 
February, the index would take the 
value of 2/12 in that year and 10/12 in 
the year before. 
Part of the year which is 




based on Beck 
et al. (2001) 
Includes the election month as being 
part of the post-election period. For 
example, if an election would be in 
February, the index would take the 
value of 11/12 in that year and 1/12 in 
the year after. 




Equals zero if one of the following 
categories applies: Freely Floating, 
Freely Falling, Freely Falling/Freely 
Floating, Freely Falling/Managed 
Floating, Freely Floating/Dual Market, 
Freely falling/Dual Market, Freely 
Falling/Multiple Rates, Freely 
Falling/Crawling Band, Freely 
Falling/Parallel Market. 




Equals zero if classified as freely 
fluctuating (1971-73), not maintained 
within relatively narrow margins 
(1974-82), more flexible arrangements 
(1983-98), managed floating or 
independently floating (1999-2001). 
GDP per capita (logarithm)  World Bank 
(2003) 
GDP per capita is gross domestic 
product divided by midyear population. 
Data are in constant U.S. dollars. 
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Appendix B (continued) 
Variable  Source  Definition 
GDP (logarithm)  World Bank 
(2003) 
GDP is the sum of gross value added 
by all resident producers in the 
economy plus any product taxes and 
minus any subsidies not included in the 
value of the products. Data are in 
constant U.S. dollars. 
Openness  World Bank 
(2003) 
Trade is the sum of exports and imports 
of goods and services measured as a 
share of gross domestic product. Data 
are in percent of GDP. 
Financial Openness  World Bank 
(2003) 
Gross private capital flows are the sum 
of the absolute values of direct, 
portfolio, and other investment inflows 
and outflows recorded in the balance of 
payments financial account, excluding 
changes in the assets and liabilities of 
monetary authorities and general 
government. Calculated as a ratio to 
GDP in U.S. dollars. 
Lending Interest Rate  World Bank 
(2003) 
Lending interest rate is the rate charged 
by banks on loans to prime customers. 
Debt (percent of GDP)  World Bank 
(2003) 
Total external debt is the sum of public, 
publicly guaranteed, and private 
nonguaranteed long-term debt, use of 
IMF credit, and short-term debt. Data 
are in percent of GDP. 
Short-term debt (percent of 
total external debt) 
World Bank 
(2003) 
Short-term debt includes all debt 
having an original maturity of one year 
or less and interest in arrears on long-
term debt. 
Money (percent of GDP)  World Bank 
(2003) 
Money and quasi money comprise the 
sum of currency outside banks, demand 
deposits other than those of the central 
government, and the time, savings, and 
foreign currency deposits of resident 
sectors other than the central 
government. 
Population (logarithm)  World Bank 
(2003) 
Total population is based on the de 
facto definition of population, which 
counts all residents regardless of legal 
status or citizenship – except for 
refugees not permanently settled in the 
country of asylum. 




Standard Deviation of previous five 
years of growth rate of exports of 
goods and services. 
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Appendix C: Descriptive Statistics (Estimation Sample) 




-9.37  0.23  -2.88  1.27 
Election, Dummy  0  1  0.28  0.45 
Part of the year which is within 
12 months prior to an election 
0  1  0.24  0.34 
Part of the year which is within 
12 months after an election 
0  1  0.24  0.33 
Fixed Exchange Rates (de 
facto), Dummy 
0  1  0.82  0.38 
Fixed Exchange Rates (de jure), 
Dummy 
0  1  0.56  0.49 
GDP per capita (log)  3.90  10.94  7.57  7.56 
GDP (log)  16.48  29.94  22.52  2.42 
Openness  6.32  361.18  68.14  42.11 
Financial Openness  0.002  800.64  15.50  41.81 
Lending Interest Rate  1.26  4774.53  22.93  102.90 
Debt (percent of GDP)  0  1064.41  73.20  74.19 
Short-term debt (percent of total 
external debt) 
0  83.37  14.16  11.69 
Money (percent of GDP)  4.11  237.37  40.61  29.58 
Population (log)  9.84  20.96  15.17  2.06 
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Appendix D: Country List 
Albania  Denmark  Lebanon  Sierra Leone 
Algeria  Dominica  Lesotho  Singapore 
Angola  Dominican Republic  Lithuania  Slovak Republic 
Antigua and Barbuds  Ecuador  Macedonia, FYR  Slovenia 
Argentina  Egypt  Madagascar  Solomon Islands 
Armenia  El Salvador  Malawi  Somalia 
Australia  Estonia  Malaysia  South Africa 
Austria  Ethiopia  Maldives  Spain 
Azerbaijan  Fiji  Mali  Sri Lanka 
Bahamas  Finland  Malta  St. Kitts and Nevis 
Bahrain  France  Mauritania  St. Lucia 
Bangladesh  Gabon  Mauritius  St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
Barbados  Gambia  Mexico  Sudan 
Belarus  Germany  Mongolia  Suriname 
Belgium  Ghana  Morocco  Swaziland 
Belize  Greece  Mozambique  Sweden 
Benin  Grenada  Namibia  Switzerland 
Bhutan  Guatemala  Nepal  Syrian Arab Republic 
Bolivia  Guinea  Netherlands  Tajikistan 
Botswana  Guinea-Bissau  New Zealand  Tanzania 
Brazil  Guyana  Nicaragua  Thailand 
Bulgaria  Haiti  Niger  Togo 
Burkina Faso  Honduras  Nigeria  Tonga 
Burundi  Hong Kong, China  Norway  Trinidad and Tobago 
Cameroon  Hungary  Oman  Tunisia 
Canada  Iceland  Pakistan  Turkey 
Cape Verde  India  Panama  Turkmenistan 
Central African Republic  Indonesia  Papua New Guinea  Uganda 
Chad  Ireland  Paraguay  Ukraine 
Chile  Israel  Peru  United Kingdom 
China  Italy  Philippines  United States 
Colombia  Jamaica  Poland  Uruguay 
Comoros  Japan  Portugal  Vanuatu 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  Jordan  Romania  Venezuela 
Congo, Rep.  Kazakhstan  Russian Federation  Vietnam 
Costa Rica  Kenya  Rwanda  Yemen, Rep. 
Cote d'Ivoire  Korea, Rep.  Samoa  Zambia 
Croatia  Kuwait  Saudi Arabia  Zimbabwe 
Cyprus  Kyrgyz Republic  Senegal   




   No.           Title                                        Authors
IMF and Economic Growth: The Effects of
Programs, Loans, and Compliance with
Conditionality
Axel Dreher
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